Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 28
Issue 5 January-February

Article 5

Winter 1938

Public Opinion and the Individualized Treatment
of Criminals
Logan Wilson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Logan Wilson, Public Opinion and the Individualized Treatment of Criminals, 28 Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 674 (1937-1938)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE INDIVIDUALIZED
TREATMENT OF CRI-MINALS
LOGAN WILSON'

In their concern with many points of view, most criminologists

have neglected a very important one-that of the layman. The
criminal has been subjected to so much probing that the non-criminal may be said to have become the forgotten man. Furthermore,
it is beginning to appear that the efforts to individualize treatment
are inevitably headed into a cul-de-sac unless more attention be
given to certain basic public sentiments. These underlying attitudes
may be circumvented but they cannot be ignored, because in them
is found the crux of many problems which baffle an effective program of action. It is not the intention of this study to find fault
with a program which offers the best known palliative for a societal
disease which has no apparent cure, but rather to ascertain what
must be dealt with by the criminologist if he is to enlist public support. Likewise, there is no implication that reform is faced with
a Hobson's choice, but merely that expediency must be made a
major ground of judgment and that ends are nonsensical without
means.
One may object that the criminologist is a specialist and that
he is therefore directly concerned with neither the non-criminal
nor his point of view. Such is the tendency of the theorist-yet the
average criminologist is an applied sociologist or psychologist, and
society has a particular suspicion of specialists who would minister
to the body politic. Especially is the public distrustful of those
who would alter institutions or single out for innovations of treatment a very significant group without due regard for the opinions
of the majority. While the public may be skeptical concerning the
practicability of specific programs of action, it nonetheless realizes
that it must turn to the theorist and research worker for knowledge. The essentially conservative nature of public opinion in ordianry circumstances is prompted by a desire to maintain the social
equilibrium and it is self-evident that popular sentiment should
view with misgivings and even hostility any threat to disrupt the
status quo. This fact accounts for its attitude toward crime per se
Department of Sociology, Harvard University.
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and also partially explains its hesitancy to adopt reforms in criminal procedure and treatment.
The criminologist, on the other hand, too often takes little
cognizance of existent public opinion, even though his thinking
within his own immediate field may be of the most realistic kind.
For conclusions to be made effective, however, the public must be
considered. The whole situation is tersely put by Professor Sheldon
Glueck in a speech before the New York State Conference on
Social Work:
You no doubt realize that during the past few years the more liberal
correctional devices, such as probation, parole and indeterminate sentence, have been under attack. This is an old phenomenon. Every few
years there seems to be a swing of the pendulum between the extremes
of a repressive point of view toward crime and a curative and rehabilitative attitude. Administration of humane and sensible devices becomes
careless and men seek refuge in patent medicine .crime cures, such as
fourth offender laws. These mechanical devices are found to be unworkable and we swing back to the opposite extreme. Hardly has one
point of view been implemented and allowed -to demonstrate its validity
when the other supersedes it. The American legislator seems to suffer
from penologic jitters. The press and public are impatient. When an
atrocious crime is committed by a probationer or a parolee, the institutions of probation and parole are bitterly assailed. Proponents of these
instruments rush to the defense by citing not altogether accurate statistics of "success." Both sides have part of the truth, but each insists the
other is wholly wrong. In the meantime the administration of justice
suffers from the confusion and uncertainly of those who enforce the
laws. .
. "Both groups seem to overlook the fact that the real issue
is not of severity versus leniency,
but of an effective versus an ineffective
administration of justice.2
Most investigators are not unaware of the impatience of the
press and the public, yet little etiological inquiry has been made.
Even among some of the more objective thinkers within the field,
there is no little confusion, and a badly muddled case has been laid
before public opinion. This unfortunate state of affairs has resulted
in a wide breach between theory and practice.
The pure theorist may neglect to take account of popular sentiment, but the legislator or social engineer cannot. The extreme
of this point of view, however, does rot infer that a realistic -stand
involves one in abstractionism or anti-intellectualism. Rather, it
infers that criminological theory cannot be founded upon an em2The Future of American Penology:

The Call for More Discriminating Law

Enforcement, Albany, New York, State Department of Correction 19.6.
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pirical basis unless it considers what Pareto calls the residues and
derivations as important variables. The criminologist as well. as the
legislator, in the choice of sanctions, must reckon with sentiments,
attitudes, and prejudices of the age. An attempt to conform to them
may result in a logical dilemma. What expert judgment deems to
be the most efficacious treatment may fail to enlist the sentiments
of the community. Past experience has shown that punishment
which is too hard causes reaction against the law and leads to the
acquittal of criminals, while other treatment which may be approved
may have no deterrent effect. Oppenheimer, in his The Rationale
of Punishment, traces the perennial perplexity:
To steer a safe course between the Scylla of public opinion and the
Charybdis of the criminal mind, indeed, is one of the most difficult tasks
which the modern statesman has to accomplish, and practical experience
alone can teach how to adjust penal sanctions in so delicate3 a fashion
that, without violating the one, they operate upon the other.
Various students of criminology have noted the conflicting penal
theories in statutory law,' but the confusion is not confined merely
to criminal statutes. There are confused attitudes in criminological
theory, in the statutory law, in penological practice, and in public
opinion, and as if this were not enough, there is considerable incompatibility in the mutual relationships of all four.
While criminological theory has gone on to individualization,
public opinion has advanced little beyond the Beccarian dictum
that "Crimes are only to be measured by the hurt done to society."
Popular notions still expect punishment (not treatment, except in
instances of very obvious mental irresponsibility) to conform to the
relative gravity of the offense. The public still zealously guards
order and views with alarm any encroachment upon it. Arbitrarily
established sanctions may within time, of course, modify prevailing
sentiment, so that the penal code, while theoretically a result of
public opinion, may in turn be a means of educating the people.
In his more rational moments the average man may acknowledge
:s Ieinrich Oppenheimer. The Rationale of Punishment, London, The University
of London Press, 1913, p. 287.
4"The survival of the traditional aims of punishment within the supposedly
individualized types of punishment is not expected. . . . Such adherence to the
past, on the other hand, possesses a high degree of social utility, for it prevents
hasty and unreasoned changes, and makes it possible to maintain a stable social
order. There is need for alarm only when the law tends to preserve the status quc
when it might be improved, or when the law becomes so reactionary as to impair
the opportunity for social advance."-Quoted from Mabel Elliott, Conflicting
Theories in Statutory Criminal Law, Chicago. The University of Chicago Press,
1931, pp. 238-239.
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that society is responsible for the production of crime and that
many delicts are not responsible to society, but rather are malignancies upon-the whole social body. When criminal justice goes
into action, however, society is likely to revert to the Hebraic dictum of plucking out the offensive member. In theory the public
is willing to grant to the criminologist that crime is symptomatic
of a more complex social disorganization, but in actual practice it
often proceeds upon another basis. Its general interest may be in
prevention, but its immediate interest is still too often in traditional
punishment.
Almost unique in sociological thought is the point of view
held by Pareto concerning the relation of common sentiment to
crime and its variables. He says:
It is certain, moreover, that the general status of sentiments in a
community has its effect on crime. There are communities of thieves,
communities of swindlers, communities of murderers, and so on. In
other words, the groups of sentiments, a, b, . . . differ according to
peoples, places, and time, and often there are-compensations between
the various genera.
To infer, for another example, that the so-called probation law is
innocuous from the assumed fact-the real fact is probably differentthat it has not increased the number of second offenders, is almost to
reason erroneously. Modifications in sentiments take place slowly, sometimes very, very slowly. Generations must pass before the effects of
that law, or any other law of the sort, can be known with certainty.
Recidivity, moreover, is not the only factor to be taken into accountthere is criminality in general. The effect of the probation law extends
beyond the criminal whom it protects. The population- at large grows
accustomed- to thinking that a first- crime may be committed with impunity; and if that manner of thinking becomes ingrained in sentiment,
diminishing the aversion for crime that the civilized human being instinctively feels, criminality may increase in general without any corresponding increase in recidivity. ",
Pareto thus raises anew the old and interesting question of the
repercussion of the penal code upon human behavior. He would
draw attention away from the individual criminal to the phenomenon of criminality in general with reference to long time consequences. In his treatment of criminality his stress is upon what
he infirs is a realistib attitude toward expediency, and a reminder
that in the practical application of a code or theory it must not. be
forgotten that the derivations which must be used are altogether
: Vilfredo Pareto. The Mind and Society, New York, Harcourt, Brace and
Company. 1935. Vol. D1. pp. 1283-1284.
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different from the logico-experimental reasonings which served to
discover the plan or law best suited to a given end. Ends themselves depend upon the interests and sentiments and it is only by
influencing or yielding to the latter that theory may be put into
force.
The rather cold-blooded attitude of Pareto toward humanitarianism is again a reflection of a widely held opinion outside the
field of theoretical criminology:
As regards the repression of crime, the "individual"-to use the
jargon now current-was once sacrificed to "society"; nowadays "society" is sacrificed to the "individual." Authorities in former days were
not so sensitive about punishing the innocent provided no guilty person
escaped. Today people make nothing of letting a culprit escape, not
only to save the innocent, but just to pamper humanitarian sentiments.'
Although the preceding jibe is directed principally at the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century humanitarians who had
little realistic knowledge of actual conditions, in another place he
takes a cut at modern theorists:
Modern theorists are in the habit of bitterly reproving ancient
"prejudices" whereby the sins of the father were visited upon the son.
They fail to notice that there is a similar thing in our own society, in
the sense that the sins of the father benefit the son and acquit him of
guilt. For the modern criminal it is a great good fortune to be able to
count somewhere among his ancestry or other relations a criminal, a
lunatic, or just a mere drunkard, for in a court of law that will win him
a lighter penalty, or not seldom, an acquittal. ...
The concept of "solidarity" that makes the good incur the punishment of the wicked appears here and there in antiquity. . . . As it is,
only is looked after and no one gives a thought to the
the criminal
7
victim.
Most modern criminologists, and particularly psychiatrists in
the field, would have little ympathy for Pareto's sarcastic outlook,
but it is one, prejudiced as it may'be, which cannot be lightly dismissed, for it is shared by a large section of society today. Individual responsibility for misconduct is still a point of departure
between expert and popular opinion.
The masses, particularly in a Western democracy, are yet unwilling to give up the illusory doctrine of freedom of the will in the
placement of social responsibility. The popular mind still considers
the neurotics. and psychotics to form a small minority, and insists
,Op. cit.

7 op. cit.
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that the majority of offenders are "normal" criminals and should
receive their just deserts without benefit of psychiatry or psychoanalysis. Hesitancy on the part of the public to accept the diagnoses
and recommendations of psychiatrists and social workers is due
in some part to the contradictions and conflicting testimony presented by the experts themselves when making court pronouncements. A comment pertinent to this point has been made by Professor Glueck: "The principle is self-evident that in a wise legal
order we should proceed cautiously in absorbing methods or attitudes from outside the law. But it must be said that the disagreement between experts has been 'greatly exaggerated.' On fundamental symptomatology of the various mental and behavior disorders most psychiatrists are agreed." (Principles of a Rational
Penal Code, p. 464.)
To turn now to another aspect of popular sentiment in relation
to criminality it is interesting to note the contentions of Alexander
and Staub. They hold that whenever the common sense of justice
is sufficiently offended there are two possible psychological consequences: the individuals of a given class think this might happen
to them (identification), and the equilibrium between social restricfions and anti-social impulses is disturbed. This disturbance favors
the impulses which hitherto had remained inhibited. Alexander
and Staub unduly simplify the basis of justice by making it rest
upon the pleasure-pain dichotomy, but they do demonstrate conclusively that the sense of justice is one of the foundations of social
life.
These two authorities give the following role to public opinion:
The judgment as to what is to be considered a crime and what should
be done with the criminal is left in the hands of specially trained jurists; however, the actual dispensing of justice remains under the constant control and is carried out with the strict participation of the public.
There is hardly any other part of public life which is watched with so
much suspicion and zeal as the work of the machine of justice.8
Especially do they consider that present day criminal justice is
faced with a crisis because it has lost much of its authority and
is exposed to much public criticism. The task of the criminologist
is vastly more complicated than it was when the aim was mere
punishment, and the work of the judge is no longer simply a matter
of consulting paragraphs in the penal code.
8 Franz Alexander and Hugo Staub, The Criminal, The Judge, and The Public,
New York, The Macmillan Company. 1931, pp. 14-15.
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The psychoanalytic approach to criminality holds that the sense
of justice does not rest upon an entirely rational foundation, and
in this respect finds itself in agreement with the sociological point
of view. A psychological understanding of the delict does not
remove the public demand for atonement. Retaliation and retribution are by no means dead issues. Furthermore, the psychoanalysts maintain that the institution of punishment "presents a
socially acceptable outlet for our own aggressions, the asocial nature
of which prevents them, as a rule, from being lived out freely ...
Hence, the institution of punishment represents a compensation."
All of these motives stand as obstacles to a rational penal code, or
one which embodies the individualized treatment of the criminal.
It is apparent that opposition to individualization is deeply rooted
in the public mind and may not be attributed solely to ignorance
or stubbornness.
Still another point of difference between current public sentiment and the most advanced ideas of treatment is involved in the
means-end scheme. The gap between logicality and utility has not
been adequately bridged, in that the system of logical action devised by the expert does not always fit into the social system. Unit
acts do not exist atomistically without relation to each other, though
logical action defines the norm of the unit acts. The norm becomes
extended to a system by means of a chain. Ends may be tangential
in this means-end chain, but eventually one eomes to the ultimate
end. In criminology, as in pure economics, the allocation of ends
is a central problem in view of limited means. There is the economic aspect in criminal procedure as well as in other forms of
social engineering and activity. And it is the very problem of the
allocation of ends, which is of extreme importance to the whole
society, which has been slighted by theoretical criminologists, particularly by some of the most ardent advocates of individualization.
Scarcity must be dealt with, and cost must be related to efficiency.
Economic and technological considerations are independently
variable in determining any given course of action, and very generally we do not use the best technological alternatives. The usual
result is that we adopt a compromise procedure to get the optimum
combination which represents neither the cheapest nor the most
efficient. Of course, a completely rational system of action in criminology or in any other complex human activity is merely a useful
fiction, but the theory of marginal utility implies a logical relationship among ultimate ends. On a theoretical basis, the maximum
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of utility (for a collectivity involves a standard of distributive jus.
tice) necessarily calls for the sacrificing of minority to majority
interests.
Since human society is neither non-rational nor rational, it does
not treat criminality in an entirely consistent manner. If it were
rational it would pursue the most efficient means of reducing criminality (or perhaps by definition such a society would have no
crime), and supposedly this is what criminologists are striving for.
Being to a large degree non-rational, however, society wishes certain ends pursued with the minimum reasonable cost. Criminality
is only one of the many problems of social disorganization which
must be handled by the state, and in the allocation of means there
are limits to the attention which can be given to any minority group.
The economic concept of scarcity acts as a check upon the full
development of individualization at this focus just as it does in any
public welfare activity. Even in the matter of public education
of the young, the public either cannot or will not meet the costs
of the best possible means of instruction. Instead, it tries to effect
a compromise in the public school program, and likewise feels that
this should be done in connection with a group in whose personal
welfare it is much less interested.
It is doubtful, then, that the public is intent upon the same
ultimate ends (though ultimate ends are always in the process of
formation and are never final as long as social values are not crystallized) as the criminologist. Intermediate ends are less vague in the
public mind and bring forth the question of means. The public
naturally takes a naive view of intermediate ends and in many cases
thinks that incapacitation of the offender solves the problem.
Michael and Adler give a pointed treatment of means and ends:
. . . One might, perhaps, add to retributive justice and the protection of society financial economy, the satisfaction of popular attitudes
toward crime and criminals, the humanization of the modes of treatment,
and even other ends. However, the humanization of treatment does not
seem to be the final end of criminal justice. The end of humanization
seems to presuppose punitive methods of treatment and to involve their
amelioration. .

.

. The end of financial economy presupposes either a

punitive or non-punitive system or a combination of the two. It does
not affect the character of the system although it may influence our
choice of methods of treatment. We may prefer less efficient methods
because -they are cheaper to administer. Financial economy therefore
seems to be a tangential and not an ultimate end of criminal justice.
In so far as a punitive system is, as has been said, a system of organized
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vengeance, the satisfaction of the desire for vengeance may be said to
be the ultimate end of a punitive system.
It is important to repeat in this connection that a means may be
considered in relation to different ends; and this is true of the processes
of criminal justice. For example, the efficiency of any method of
treatment may be measured either by its effect upon the behavior of
actual and potential offenders, or in such terms as its financial cost,
security against escape, and the convenience, comfort and welfare of
officials and offenders. . . . Moreover, a means may be highly efficient
in relation to one end and extremely inefficient in relation to another
. . . it is, for example, a meaningless question to ask if the police are
efficient or the grand jury is efficient or the prosecution of offenders is
efficient, unless we are told in relation to what end the question is
askedP
The whole subject matter of criminology is so tied up with
practical considerations that it cannot be divorced from administrative problems without emasculating its contents. Hence the inefficiency of justice is a concern of the broader aspects of theory.
Enforcement of aims brings with it the attendant question of tangential ends, and somewhere in the process there is an inevitable
compromise.
Because many criminologists have given little attention to tangential ends, and have regarded them largely as problems for
practical administrators, their systems often rest upon fallacious
assumptions and fail to take cognizance of matters of vital importance in the public eye. The public, for example, is very much
more interested in the certainty and celerity of administration than
in the more fundamental considerations of causation. Another
tangential end which is a point of departure between the public
and those who enforce the law is what Dean Pound calls "checks
upon prosecution." These safeguards for the innocent are too often
loopholes for the wary and experienced criminal, but public opinion
in the past has demanded them.
One should not conclude that public opinion is always a sort
of vicious dog in the manger which blocks the way to a more scientific application of the best ideas of modern criminology. Undoubtedly, though, many of the obstacles to improvement are traceable to this source. Dean Pound has stated:
As one reads the discussions in the reports of bar associations he
9 Jerome Michael and Mortimer J. Adler, Crime, Law, and Social Science, New

York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1933, pp. 21-22.
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can but feel that a chief obstacle to improvement is in the democratic
tradition; in what we must pronounce false ideas of democracy.
Another obstacle, it may as well be said frankly, will be found in
the attitude of the press in the United States toward criminal investigation, prosecution, and trial . . . .
NonethelesS, public sentiment may lead to reform. Richard
W. Child cites the importance of public opinion in instigating the
famed Cleveland Crime Survey. The brief published by the Cleveland Foundation opens with the sentence:
The Cleveland Survey of criminal justice marked the culmination
of a long period of growing public distrust in the quality of law enforcement in Cleveland.
And the same publication ends with these words:
The survey was intended to do no more than analyze the problem
in its entirety, to point out the essential improvements, and to show the
way by which such changes can be brought about. More important
still, it has an educational value. It was intended to capture public
interest, to get a large number of people to think simultaneously about
this specific problem and to use this public interest to insure a permanent
result. It was intended from the beginning not merely to rouse interest,
but to use an aroused interest to promote permanent and intelligently
directed facilities for informing and releasing public opinion.
The public must be shown that there is economy as well as
justice in the individualized treatment of the criminal, but the
criminologist in his zeal for improvement should not fail to take
account of the Wesenwille as well as the Kiirwille. To say that the
crux of the whole problem lies in public opinion may be going too
far, but group sentiments do form an important variable in the vast
complexity of the whole phenomena.
lo Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in America, New York, Henry Holt and
Company, 1930, p. 198.

